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Protecting Addicts in the Employment




In July of 1984, Dorothy Wallace responded to a newspaper
advertisement for a nursing position in the Intensive Care Unit
(ICU) at the Veteran's Administration (VA) Hospital in Wichita,
Kansas.' Ms. Wallace, a trained and licensed registered nurse,
had extensive work experience in intensive care units.2 Despite
her impressive qualifications, the VA Hospital refused to hire Ms.
Wallace because she was a recovering drug addict.3 Although she
had been free of drug use for nine months, successfully completed
a drug rehabilitation program and possessed a letter of recom-
mendation from her treating physician, the VA Hospital discrimi-
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1. Wallace v. Veterans Admin., 683 F. Supp. 758, 759 (D. Kan. 1988).
2. Id. at 759. Ms. Wallace had been employed in several nursing positions,
and the court had "no doubt that [she] was well qualified for a position in the ICU
of the V.A. Hospital." Id.
3. Id. at 759-60. The VA Hospital asserted that as a recovering addict, Ms.
Wallace could not administer narcotics and thus was unable to perform the duties
of a nurse working in the ICU. Id. at 765. The court disagreed with the VA Hos-
pital, finding that Ms. Wallace had proved a prima facie case of "handicap dis-
crimination" under the Rehabilitation Act, shifting the burden to the government
employer to prove that the requirement was an "essential function of the job." Id.
Since narcotics administration constituted less than 2% of a registered nurse's
(R.N.) time on the job, the court found that the inability to administer narcotics
"does not prevent an otherwise qualified nurse from being able to perform the es-
sentials of the position if reasonable accommodation is made." Id.
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nated against Ms. Wallace by refusing to hire her because of her
past drug addiction. 4 Consequently, she filed suit for employment
discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.5
To date, federal court decisions regarding drug and alcohol
addicts under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)6
and the Rehabilitation Act of 19737 have established a spectrum of
holdings, standards and rulings which provide employers little
guidance and employees little security.8 This lack of guidance has
left the judiciary without an authoritative interpretation of who
qualifies as an addict under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act.
Further, courts are split over the degree of protection to be af-
forded an addict. Without clear guidance, courts have drifted far-
ther and farther away from the purpose of both the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act:9 to protect those with disabilities, including
drug addiction and alcoholism, from employment discrimination
on the basis of that disability.10 Federal courts have failed to give
4. Id. at 759-60. The VA Hospital argued that it was unable to accommodate
Ms. Wallace because it would have to hire additional staff, staff morale would be
harmed, and the restriction on her narcotic administration duties would compro-
mise patient care. Id. at 766. The court rejected these arguments as speculative,
however, because the record showed no attempt on the part of the VA Hospital to
try to accommodate Ms. Wallace, and because the VA Hospital failed to present
any factual foundation for its assertion that the restriction on Ms. Wallace's duties
would preclude safe employment. Id. (citing Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416,
1423 (9th Cir. 1985)). An employer can only make a decision as to the reasonable-
ness of accommodation by first gathering facts as to whether the accommodation
would preclude safe employment. Id.
5. Ms. Wallace alleged that the VA Hospital violated §§ 501, 504 and 505 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794, 794(a)(1), which prohibit dis-
crimination against handicapped individuals. See Wallace, 683 F. Supp. at 759.
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1994). Although the Rehabilitation Act consists of
seven titles, this article focuses on § 504 of Title V, which contains the substantive
employment discrimination provisions. Section 504 prohibits discrimination
against individuals with disabilities by executive agencies or federally assisted
programs and activities. 29 U.S.C. § 794.
8. See infra Part II.B.3.
9. For example, in Maddox v. University of Tennessee, 62 F.3d 843 (6th Cir.
1995), the Sixth Circuit rejected the Second Circuit's decision in Teahan v. Metro-
North Commuter R.R., 951 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1991), which protected alcoholic con-
duct caused solely by reason of that disability against discrimination under the
Rehabilitation Act. See infra notes 92-93 (discussing Teahan and its subsequent
history). The Maddox court did so even though it assumed that alcoholics may be
"individual[s] with a disability" for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C.§
706(8)(A). 62 F.3d at 846. The Maddox court held that a distinction existed be-
tween an employee's disability and any misconduct related to that disability, and
upheld a university's termination of a disabled (alcoholic) assistant coach for pub-
lic drunkenness resulting from his alcoholism. Id. at 847.
10. The stated purpose of the ADA is "to provide a clear and comprehensive
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
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importance to medical definitions of addiction which describe it as
a disabling disease." Consequently, courts have failed to protect
individuals with medical conditions qualifying as addictions,
thereby falling short in their protection of persons with disabili-
ties.
Dorothy Wallace was fortunate and won her fight against her
discriminatory employer. 12 The Kansas Federal District Court
held that she met all of the necessary and legitimate requirements
of the VA Hospital's ICU nursing position. 13 Unfortunately, most
addicts are not as successful as Ms. Wallace. Terminated because
of their addiction, most employees are left without remedy when
the judicial system fails them.' 4 The federal judiciary, in its inter-
pretation of employment discrimination laws, should focus on
medical realities rather than social prejudices 15 and protect an ad-
disabilities." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). See also H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(11), at 51
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 276, 332 (providing legislative history using
identical language to summarize the policy behind enactment of the Act). "[Tihere
is a compelling need to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for
the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities and for the
integration of persons with disabilities into the economic and social mainstream of
American life." Id. For the statutory language proclaiming the purposes of the
ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, see infra note 20.
11. For a medical discussion of addiction as a disabling physical and psycho-
logical condition, see infra note 48.
12. Wallace v. Veterans Admin., 683 F. Supp. 758, 767 (D. Kan. 1988)
13. See id. at 762, 767. In the face of the nurse's evidence that recovering
R.N.s with restrictions do not compromise patient care or affect staff morale, the
court reasoned that the VA Hospital's "conjecture about the risk to patients and
morale" was insufficient. Id. The court found that "[iun truth, the VA rejected
Dorothy Wallace because it was unenlightened and uneducated about recovering
nurses." Id. at 767. The court held that the VA Hospital had failed to sustain its
burden of showing that Ms. Wallace could not have been reasonably accommo-
dated, as it is obligated to do under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Id.
14. See, e.g., Despears v. Milwaukee County, 63 F.3d 635 (7th Cir. 1995)
(upholding termination of alcoholic maintenance worker for off-duty misconduct);
Little v. FBI, 1 F.3d 255 (4th Cir. 1993) (upholding termination of an FBI worker
who relapsed during participation in a rehabilitation program).
15. Many addicts seek treatment and are capable of handling their medical
situation before, during and after treatment. See Criteria Comm. Nat'l. Council on
Alcoholism, Criteria for the Diagnosis of Alcoholism, 77 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED.
249, 255 (1972) (hereinafter Criteria Committee). The Committee found:
Intermittent or recurrent drinking may represent a phase in the course of
alcoholism .... In many individuals daily drinking increases until the in-
dividual himself slowly becomes aware that physiological and psychologi-
cal dependence exist. At this point periods of "going on the wagon" may
occur, with resulting intermittent or recurrent patterns of drinking. For
most drinkers, there are lesser or greater periods of time when, because of
circumstances or the acute effects of alcohol, drinking is not possible.
This pattern is not inconsistent with other drug dependency situations, in
which interruptions of use are commonplace ....
Id. In addition, the Committee commented:
[There are many patients who, after a time of complete sobriety, have re-
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dict in the workplace, just as any other disabled individual is pro-
tected.16
Part I of this article summarizes statutory employment dis-
crimination law under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
and the Rehabilitation Act, offering a current definition of an ad-
dict and describing the treatment of drug and alcohol addicts un-
der the Acts. Courts have created chaos in interpreting the Acts
by focusing on particular facts of cases rather than a clear stan-
dard or rule. 17 Part II of this article addresses this chaos, laying
out a line of decisions extending in two directions: one toward the
protection of disabled addicts, the other toward a complete preclu-
sion of protection for addicts.' 8 This chaos demands that a new
standard be established within the spectrum of holdings articu-
lated to date. Part III of this article argues that judicial interpre-
tations of the Acts should be guided by a standard which considers
conduct caused by the addiction a part of the disability itself, thus
clarifying the confusion as to what is covered by the Acts. In addi-
tion, statutory reform and clarification are necessary. The present
exemption precluding currently-using addicts from ADA and Re-
habilitation Act coverage must be narrowed to exclude an em-
ployee only when he or she is currently using on the job. The pre-
sent blanket denial of protection to addicts contravenes and
defeats the purpose of the ADA with respect to addicts.' 9 These
new judicial and statutory standards would reverse the current
trend toward intolerance and reiterate the stated legislative intent
of both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act: to protect individuals
with disabilities from discrimination. 20
ordered their lives in a rehabilitative way and are completely able to per-
form complex and responsible tasks. There are also a few patients who
have returned to "social" drinking or who have infrequent "slips" but who
still function as rehabilitated persons.
Id.
16. See infra note 126 (emphasizing how the judiciary's interpretation of the
Rehabilitation Act reflects societal notions that are incongruous with the protec-
tive goals of the Act).
17. See Eric Harbrook Cottrell, There's Too Much Confusion Here, And I Can't
Get No Relief- Alcoholic Employees and the Federal Rehabilitation Act in Little v,
FBI, 72 N.C. L. REv. 1753, 1753 (1994) ('Interpretation of the provisions of the
[Rehabilitation Act] . .. has been clouded by imprecise congressional drafting and
inconsistent treatment by the federal judiciary.").
18. Illustrative of the disagreement among courts is a circuit split on the issue
of whether the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act protect addicts for conduct caused
"solely by" their addiction. See infra notes 92-116 and accompanying text.
19. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (1994) (stating the purpose of the ADA); see also
infra note 20.
20. See supra note 10. The ADA's and the Rehabilitation Act's stated purposes
reflect the congressional intent to protect disabled individuals. The ADA states:
[Vol. 15:157
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I. The Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with
Disabilities Act
Federal adjudication of employment discrimination has fo-
cused on two key pieces of legislation, the ADA and theRehabilita-
tion Act.21 These Acts incorporate similar definitions and stan-
dards. 22 As a result, courts have analyzed ADA and Rehabilitation
Act discrimination cases under equivalent standards and frame-
works. 23 To understand the need for changes in the judicial
It is the purpose of this chapter-
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities; (2)
to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing
discrimination against individuals with disabilities; (3) to ensure that
the Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing the stan-
dards established in this chapter on behalf of individuals with dis-
abilities; (4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including
the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate
commerce, in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced
day-to-day by people with disabilities.
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b). The Rehabilitation Act's purposes focus on individual self-
empowerment as well:
The purposes of this chapter are-
(1) to empower individuals with disabilities to maximize employ-
ment, economic self-sufficiency, independence, and inclusion and in-
tegration into society through
(A) comprehensive and coordinated state-of-the-art programs of
vocational rehabilitation;. ..
(F) the guarantee of equal opportunity; and
(2) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a leadership role in
promoting the employment of individuals with disabilities, especially
individuals with severe disabilities, and in assisting States and pro-
viders of services in fulfilling the aspirations of such individuals with
disabilities for meaningful and gainful employment and independent
living.
29 U.S.C. § 701(b) (1994).
21. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1994).
22. See Joseph S. Kass, Disability Discrimination Litigatiow A Legal and
Strategic Update, in EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES 1, 2 n.2 (1995).
"Although the ADA is more extensive in its coverage than the Rehabilitation Act,
the ADA contains much of the same statutory and regulatory language ... [as the]
Rehabilitation Act." Id. Because courts have already interpreted those sections of
the Rehabilitation Act, looking to Rehabilitation Act cases interpreting such lan-
guage gives guidance to understanding ADA interpretation by courts. Id.
23. The preference of federal courts to adjudicate Rehabilitation Act and ADA
claims under similar frameworks and standards is evidenced by case law, statu-
tory language and scholarly observation. E.g., Ennis v. National Ass'n of Bus. and
Educ. Radio, 53 F.3d 55, 57 (4th Cir. 1995) (discussing the Fourth Circuit's prefer-
ence for "adjudic[ating] ADA claims in a manner consistent with decisions inter-
preting the Rehabilitation Act"). The Rehabilitation Act, as revised and approved
on July 7, 1995, contains a description of the standards used in determining a
violation of its section on non-discrimination under federal grants and programs.
29 U.S.C. § 794.
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treatment of addicts in employment discrimination cases, one
must first be familiar with the substance of the Acts, the subtle
differences between them in their treatment of addicts and the
federal judiciary's inattention to these differences.
A. Purposes and Provisions of the Rehabilitation Act
The stated purpose of the Rehabilitation Act in 1973 was "to
empower individuals with disabilities to maximize employment,
economic self-sufficiency, independence, and inclusion and inte-
gration into society."24 Congress sought to protect disabled work-
ers and eliminate discrimination against them by employers, in-
cluding public sector employers such as government contractors
and recipients of federal financial assistance. 25 The Rehabilitation
According to its own statutory language, the standards to be used in deter-
mining whether section 794 has been violated in a complaint alleging employment
discrimination under section 794 of the Rehabilitation Act "shall be the standards
applied under title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990" as those sec-
tions of the ADA relate to employment. Id. § 794(d). Also, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) developed its regulations for implementing the
ADA by using the regulations and case law interpreting the Rehabilitation Act.
Equal Employment Opportunity for Individuals with Disabilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,
726 (1991) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630 (1995)).
As one scholar stated, "courts can rely on precedent forged under the Rehabili-
tation Act in deciding [ADA] issues." John L. Flynn, Mixed-Motive Causation Un-
der the ADA- Linked Statutes, Fuzzy Thinking, and Clear Statements, 83 GEO. L.J.
2009, 2009 (1995); see also Cottrell, supra note 17, at 1753. The ADA and the Re-
habilitation Act "incorporate many of the same ideas and were designed to work
together." Id. But cf. Kathy A. Wolverton, Protecting Alcoholics Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act and New York Law: A Statutory Tug of War, 57
ALB. L. REV. 527, 541 (1993) (questioning the value of applying Rehabilitation Act
cases to ADA cases because the Rehabilitation Act only applies to the federal gov-
ernment and those employers receiving a measurable amount of federal funding,
whereas the ADA applies to both the private and public sector).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1). See full text supra note 20. "Congress enacted the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973... in an effort to maximize handicapped persons' em-
ployability, independence, and integration into the workplace and community."
L.D. Clark, Shields v. City of Shreveport: Federal Grantees Under the Rehabilita-
tion Act Escape Duty of Reasonable Accommodation Toward Alcoholics, 66 TUL. L.
REV. 603, 605 (1991). The legislative history of the Act indicates it was enacted to
"promote and expand employment opportunities in the public and private sectors
for handicapped individuals." Jennifer L. Adams, At Work While "Under the Influ-
ence" The Employer's Response to a Hazardous Condition, 70 MARQ. L. REV. 88,
109 (1986) (citing S. REP. No. 93-318, at 49 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2076).
25. The text of the Rehabilitation Act's nondiscrimination provision reads as
follows:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States
... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimina-
tion under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance
or under any program or activity conducted by an Executive agency or by
the United States Postal Service.
[Vol. 15:157
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Act explicitly excludes currently abusing drug addicts from protec-
tion in the employment context. 26
B. Purposes and Provisions of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.
To enlarge the scope of protection for individuals with dis-
abilities, Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act in
1990.27 The ADA extended the remedies already provided under
the Rehabilitation Act 28 against federally-funded programs and ac-
tivities. 29 The ADA prohibits discrimination against individuals
with disabilities 30 and individuals associated with disabled peo-
ple,31 and allows actions to be brought against private employers
who discriminate.32
29 U.S.C. § 794(a). See also Clark, supra note 24, at 605 (noting that a handi-
capped individual has a private right of action and is not required to exhaust any
administrative remedies prior to bringing an action).
26. See 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(C)(i) (1994)The text of the statute reads: "The
term 'individual with a disability' does not include an individual who is currently
engaging in the illegal use of drugs, when a covered entity acts on the basis of such
use." Id. Congress's concern with requiring governmental employers to hold sub-
stance-abusing employees to the same standards as non-using employees
prompted the addition of this exclusion in the 1978 amendments. See Clark, supra
note 24, at 606-07.
27. The ADA has been heralded as the most sweeping anti-discrimination
measure in the last twenty years. Wolverton, supra note 23, at 540. This recogni-
tion is in part because the ADA is "non-exclusive" and "non-preemptive," allowing
more protective state anti-discrimination laws to remain in effect. Alan M. Koral,
Major Provisions of the Statute, in EMPLOYER COMPLIANCE WITH THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT 7, 11 (PLI Corp. L. & Prac. Course Handbook Series No.
714, 1990). See also Ellenwood v. Exxon Shipping Co., 984 F.2d 1270, 1277 (1st
Cir. 1993) (holding that the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act do not preclude the
availability of additional state or federal remedies).
The ADA was intended to provide a clear and comprehensive national man-
date for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.
Flynn, supra note 23, at 2012-13. The ADA also specifically abolishes the immu-
nity provided to states under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution, allowing individuals to bring actions for damages against state govern-
ments. John Albrecht, A Guide to Employment Discrimination Cases Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, NEV. LAW., Feb. 1993, at 20 (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 12202). For an extensive description of the ADA, see Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., The
Americans With Disabilities Act: Analysis and Inplications of a Second-Generation
Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 413 (1991).
28. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (describing the scope of the Re-
habilitation Act).
29. See Ellenwood, 984 F.2d at 1277 (noting that the ADA amended the Reha-
bilitation Act, extending remedies for employment disability discrimination suits
against many more private employers).
30. A disability is defined in the ADA as "(A) a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an im-




According to its stated findings, the ADA was prompted in
part by the discrimination and prejudice that denies disabled
Americans equal opportunities and costs the United States billions
of dollars due to the dependency and nonproductivity of unem-
ployed disabled Americans.3 3 Title I of the ADA prohibits private
sector employers 34 with fifteen or more employees from discrimi-
nating against "qualified individuals with disabilities" who are ca-
pable of performing the "essential functions" of the job in question
with or without the "reasonable accommodation" of the employer. 35
Title II requires all state and local agencies to adhere to Title I re-
A person who has had a leg amputated but wears a prosthetic device has a
disability. First, the disability is determined without considering the
prosthesis. Second, the loss of the leg is an anatomical loss. Third, it af-
fects the musculoskeletal system. It is a physical impairment within the
meaning of the regulations and ADA. Further, this impairment substan-
tially limits a major life activity. This person is unable to walk without
the prosthesis. This person has a disability within the meaning of the
ADA.
Albrecht, supra note 27, at 21.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 12112. The ADA prohibits discrimination against either an
applicant or an existing employee who does not have a disability but who associ-
ates with a person who does have a disability. Id. For example, an employee
whose spouse has AIDS would be protected under this provision of the ADA. Kass,
supra note 22, at 2 n.3. This association can be through any relationship such as
caregiver, relative, friend or business associate. Id.
32. See Ellenwood, 984 F.2d at 1277. The First Circuit described the ADA as
an example of Congress's "historical practice of allowing overlapping remedies for
employment discrimination," pointing to the ADA provision that the legislation
shall not "limit the remedies, rights, and procedures of any ... law of any State
.... .Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12201(b)). The court held that remedies under state
discrimination statutes prohibiting discrimination by private employers and reme-
dies available under state contract and estoppel claims were not preempted by the
Rehabilitation Act. Eflenwood, 984 F.2d at 1277. As proof, the court pointed to
the ADA, "which amended the Rehabilitation Act and extended remedies for
handicap discrimination against many more private employers," and its provisions
allowing overlapping remedies. Id.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a). The legislation was prompted by the continuing exis-
tence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination and prejudice [which] denies peo-
ple with disabilities the opportunity to compete on an equal basis and to pursue
those opportunities for which free society is justifiably famous, and costs the
United States billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting from depend-
ency and nonproductivity. Id. § 12101 (a)(9).
34. An "employer" is defined as "a person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or
more calendar weeks in the current or preceding year, and any agent of [the em-
ployer]." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A).
35. Wolverton, supra note 23, at 541. See also 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (forbidding
such discrimination). See also H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 51 (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.ANN. 276, 336. The legislative history describes the scope of the
Act's coverage as "employers (including governments, governmental agencies, and
political subdivisions) who are engaged in an industry affecting commerce and who
have 15 or more employees for each working day .... Id.
[Vol. 15:157
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gardless of the number of employees.3 6 The ADA covers many
types of employer activities including: 1) recruitment, advertising
and job application procedures; 2) hiring, upgrading, promotion
and termination; 3) pay rates and 4) fringe benefits, or any other
term or condition of employment. 37 The ADA expands on existing
remedies available to disabled employees and applicants who are
discriminated against.38
Like the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA allows employers to
prohibit the use of alcohol and the illegal use of drugs during
working hours.39 It also permits employers to hold disabled ad-
dicts to the same performance and behavior standards as non-
disabled employees, even if the unsatisfactory performance or be-
havior is related to the employee's drug addiction or alcoholism.
40
C. Bringing an Employment Discrimination Case Under
the Acts
When a disabled employee believes she has been discrimi-
nated against and wants to seek remedies under the ADA, the Re-
habilitation Act or both, certain elements must be met.41 For an
36. Kass, supra note 22, at 2-3.
37. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4 (1995). Regulations implementing the ADA list
eight employer actions as unlawful discrimination. This list is not exclusive and
includes: classifying a job applicant in a way that adversely affects the disabled
employee because of the disability, participating in contractual arrangements that
discriminate against an applicant or employee with a disability, using standards
that have the effect of discriminating, denying equal job benefits, not making rea-
sonable accommodations to the known limitations of the employee (unless doing so
imposes an undue hardship on the operation of the employer's business), denying
employment opportunities based on the employer's need to make such reasonable
accommodations, using selection criteria that tend to screen out individuals with
disabilities and failing to administer employment tests in the most effective man-
ner. See id. §§ 1630.5-1630.11.
38. The ADA neither invalidates nor limits the remedies, rights or procedures
available under any law that provides a greater or equal degree of protection for
individuals with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(b) (1994). The ADA provides dis-
abled people with, and limits them to, the powers, remedies and procedures avail-
able to those bringing discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin. Kass, supra note 22,
at 5. Remedies under Title VII are no longer limited to lost back pay, reinstate-
ment, injunctive relief and attorney's fees due to the passage of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991. Id. They can now include compensatory damages for emotional dis-
tress and limited punitive damages, as well as jury trials for ADA employment
discrimination claims. Id.
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(1).
40. Id. § 12114(c)(2)-(4).
41. See McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (setting out the
prima facie discrimination standard for Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17, used by other courts in discrimination cases, includ-
ing employment discrimination cases under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA).
1997]
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individual wrongfully terminated or refused employment because
of her status as a drug or alcohol addict, bringing a discrimination
action under the Acts requires tailoring the elements of the claim
to fit the case of a disabled addict.
42
The first step in bringing a lawsuit against an employer for
disability discrimination under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act
is establishing that the employee is an individual with a disabil-
ity.43 Congress,44 executive agencies, 45 federal courts,46 the Attor-
In McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court stated:
The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden under
the statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination.
This may be done by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii)
that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was
seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected;
and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the em-
ployer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifi-
cations.
Id. at 802. The Court also noted that these requirements were fact-specific and
would vary from case to case. Id. at 802 n.13.
The Sixth Circuit applied the McDonnell Douglas standard to Rehabilitation
Act cases and found that to establish a violation of the Act, a plaintiff must show:
(1) The plaintiff is a "handicapped person" under the Act; (2) The plaintiff
is "otherwise qualified" for participation in the program; (3) The plaintiff
is being excluded from participation in, being denied the benefits of, or
being subjected to discrimination under the program solely by reason of
his handicap; and (4) The relevant program or activity is receiving Fed-
eral financial assistance.
Maddox v. University of Tenn., 62 F.3d 843, 846 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing Doherty v.
Southern College of Optometry, 862 F.2d 570, 573 (6th Cir. 1988)).
The Fourth Circuit found the McDonnell Douglas analysis applicable to the
ADA as well. See Ennis v. National Ass'n of Bus. and Educ. Radio, 53 F.3d 55, 58
(4th Cir. 1995). In Ennis, the court compared the analysis of an ADA case to the
McDonnell Douglas standards and found that in a typical discharge case brought
under the ADA, the prima facie test was met if the plaintiff could show, by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, that "(1) she was in the protected class; (2) she was
discharged; (3) at the time of the discharge, she was performing her job at a level
that met her employer's legitimate expectations; and (4) her discharge occurred
under circumstances that raise a reasonable inference of unlawful discrimination."
Id. (citing Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)).
See also infra note 60 (discussing the standards for a prima facie employment dis-
crimination case).
42. The Supreme Court noted in McDonnell Douglas that the elements would
vary depending on the claim brought. 411 U.S. at 802 n.13.
43. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994). See also statutory text supra note 30.
Because the ADA defines a disability as a physical or mental impairment, addic-
tion is biologically within this definition. Dr. Miller of the University of Illinois at
Chicago, Department of Psychiatry, has said that addiction is within the clinical
definition of "disease." See NORMAN S. MILLER, M.D., ADDICTION PSYCHIATRY:
CURRENT DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT 81 (1995) ('Alcoholism and drug addiction fit
exactly into this definition because an addiction to alcohol and drugs is a definite
morbid process that produces characteristic and identifiable signs and symptoms
affecting many organ systems in the body."). David Malikin, Professor of Rehabili-
tation Education at New York University, also considers alcoholism a disease and
labels it a "psychological disablement." DAVID MALIKIN, SOCIAL DISABILITY:
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ALCOHOLISM, DRUG ADDICTION, CRIME AND SOCIAL DISADVANTAGE 57 (1973).
44. Congress expressed its intention to include addiction as a disease covered
by the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act both through specific statutory provisions
and legislative history. The ADA defines a disability as "a physical or mental im-
pairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such
individual." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). It specifically excludes individuals currently
engaging in the illegal use of drugs, id. § 12114(a), but covers those who have
completed rehabilitation programs, id. § 12114(b). The Rehabilitation Act uses the
same language to define an individual with a disability as the ADA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 706(8)(B) (1994). It also creates the same exception for currently using addicts,
id. § 706(8)(c)(i), and the same "exception to the exception" for rehabilitated ad-
dicts, id. § 706(8)(c)(ii).
Congress also expressed its intention to protect addicts under the ADA in its
debates and discussions prior to enactment. In discussing the term "disability,"
both the Senate Report and House Report included drug and alcohol addiction.
See S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 22 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 51 (1990), re-
printed in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 333. The House Report noted that "Itihe term
[disability] includes . . . such conditions, diseases and infections as: orthopedic,
visual, speech and hearing impairments, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular dys-
trophy, multiple sclerosis, infection with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus,
cancer, heart disease, diabetes, mental retardation, emotional illness, specific
learning disabilities, drug addiction, and alcoholism." Id. (emphasis added).
45. Regulations implementing the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act also recog-
nize and define addiction as a disabling disease covered by the Acts. Department
of Justice regulations implementing the ADA define "physical or mental impair-
ment" to include "drug addiction" and "alcoholism," although they specifically ex-
clude certain disorders resulting from the "current illegal use of drugs." 28 C.F.R.
§ 35.104(1)(ii), (5)(iii) (1995). EEOC regulations implementing the equal employ-
ment provisions of the ADA state that the terms "disability" and "qualified indi-
vidual with a disability" include an individual who has successfully completed or is
participating in a rehabilitation program and is no longer engaging in illegal use.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.3(b) (1995). In addition, the EEOC's Americans With Disabilities
Technical Assistance Manual provides that "(plersons addicted to drugs, but who
are no longer using drugs illegally and are receiving treatment for drug addiction
or who have been rehabilitated successfully, are protected by the ADA from dis-
crimination on the basis of past drug addiction." Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990: EEOC Technical Assistance Manual, Lab. L. Rep. (CC) Rep. 437, 8.5
(Feb. 14, 1992).
46. Federal case law has interpreted both addiction and alcoholism to be dis-
eases within the protective purview of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. The
Supreme Court first recognized addiction as a disease in 1925. See Linder v.
United States, 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925) (stating that addicts are "diseased" and proper
subjects for treatment). The Linder Court refused to conclude that a doctor acted
improperly, or for purposes other than medical, when he dispensed "morphine or
cocaine for relief of conditions incident to addiction." Id. Thirty-five years later in
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), the Supreme Court held that a state
criminal law punishing the "status" of being a narcotic addict inflicted a cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, in part because
narcotic addiction was an illness and was, indeed, "apparently an illness which
may be contracted innocently or involuntarily." Id. at 666-67.
Federal circuit and district courts have recognized addiction as a disease as
well in the years following Linder. The United States District Court of Kansas
recognized alcoholism and drug addiction as included in the Rehabilitation Act's
definition of disabled in Wallace v. Veterans Administration, 683 F. Supp. 758, 761
(D. Kan. 1988) (citing Tinch v. Walters, 765 F.2d 599 (6th Cir. 1985)). See also
Whitlock v. Donovan, 598 F. Supp. 126 (D.D.C. 1984), affd, 790 F.2d 964 (1986);
Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1978). The Second Circuit reflected
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ney General 47 and the medical community48 have all recognized
addiction as a disabling disease covered by both Acts. By classi-
fring addiction as a disease that qualifies for disability protection
under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, it becomes clear that
addicts need the same protection in the employment arena as
other individuals with disabilities. The ADA requires that "[n]o
covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual
with a disability because of the disability of such individual."49
The ADA defines a "qualified individual with a disability" as a per-
son who can perform the essential function of the job with or with!
out accommodation from the employer. 50
the common rule in case law today, finding "it is clear that substance abuse is a
'handicap' for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act." Teahan v. Metro-North Com-
muter R.R., 951 F.2d 511, 517 (2d Cir. 1991).
47. A 1977 U.S. Attorney General's Opinion concluded that both alcoholics and
drug addicts are "handicapped individuals" for purposes of Title V of the Rehabili-
tation Act (which used "handicapped" throughout to describe individuals with dis-
abilities). 43 Op. Att'y Gen. 12 (1977).
48. One medical dictionary defines addiction as "the state of physical depend-
ence induced by such drugs as morphine, heroin and alcohol, but it is also used for
the state of psychological dependence, produced by drugs such as barbiturates."
THE BANTAM MEDICAL DICTIONARY 6 (rev. ed. 1990). Furthermore, many medical
experts define alcoholism as a disease, much like AIDS or cancer. See, e.g.,
Maurice Victor & Raymond D. Adams, Alcohol, in HARRISON'S PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNAL MEDICINE 1285, 1285 (Robert G. Petersdorf et al. eds., 10th ed. 1983);
Charles L. Whitfield et al., Alcoholism, in PRINCIPLES OF AMBULATORY MEDICINE
245, 248 (L. Randol Barker et al. eds., 2d ed. 1986). But see Ellison v. Software
Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that breast cancer was not a
disability based on specific facts of that case).
Medical authority has repeatedly agreed that drug addiction and alcoholism
are disabling diseases of both the body and mind. The National Committee on Al-
coholism found that "[a]lcoholism fits the definition of disease given in Dorland's
Illustrated Medical Dictionary, 24th edition: 'A definite morbid process having a
characteristic train of symptoms; it may affect the whole body or any of its parts,
and its etiology, pathology, and prognosis may be known or unknown."' Criteria
Committee, supra note 15, at 250. The Committee also noted that the description
of alcoholism as a disease is agreed upon by the American College of Physicians,
the American Medical Association, the American Psychiatric Association and other
medical organizations. Id. In addition, Dr. A. Thomas McClellan, Director of
Clinical Research at the Drug Dependence Service at the Philadelphia VA Medical
Center, noted the biological and social characteristics of addiction when he and
other doctors observed that "addiction may be more realistically considered as a
complex of potential treatment problems manifested by symptoms in the area of
medical, psychological, legal, economic, and social function, as well as chemical
dependence." EDWARD GOTTHEIL ET AL., SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND PSYCHIATRIC
ILLNESS 152 (1972).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994). Covered entities include both public and pri-
vate employers, employment agencies, labor organizations or joint labor-
management committees. Id. § 12111(2).
50. See id. § 12111(8).
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Once an addict employee establishes that she is a qualified
individual with a disability,51 the second step in bringing an em-
ployment discrimination claim under the ADA or the Rehabilita-
tion Act is showing she is "otherwise qualified," with or without
the disability.52 In assessing whether an employee is "otherwise
qualified," the ADA requires an employer to make "reasonable ac-
commodations" for the employee's disability. 53 If after this ac-
commodation the employee can perform the essential functions of
the job, the employee may not be legally terminated or denied em-
ployment because of her disability. 54 Thus, the "reasonable ac-
commodation" is linked to whether the employee is "otherwise
qualified." When an employee with a disability is unable to per-
form the essential functions of the position, the court must con-
sider whether any reasonable accommodation would enable the
employee to perform those functions. 5
5
As an affirmative defense, the employer may demonstrate
that "reasonable accommodation" 56 of the disabled employee would
51. See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text (establishing addiction as a
disabling disease under both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). See also Leary v. Dalton, 58 F.3d 748, 753 (1st Cir.
1995) (requiring a plaintiff bringing Rehabilitation Act claim to show he is a quali-
fied individual with respect to his employment, with or without reasonable ac-
commodation, and can perform the essential function of his job: in this case arriv-
ing on time).
53. The statutory text of this section provides:
the term "discriminate" includes ... not making reasonable accommoda-
tions to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise quali-
fied individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless
such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would im-
pose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered
entity....
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (emphasis added). "Reasonable accommodation" may
include, but is not limited to, making existing facilities accessible and job restruc-
turing including part-time schedules or reassignments. Id. § 12111(9); 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(o)(2) (1995).
54. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), (b)(5)(A).
55. Clark, supra note 24, at 608.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994). See statutory text supra note 53. "The
ADA imposes an affirmative financial obligation on employers to reasonably ac-
commodate the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified ap-
plicant or employee with a disability." Kass, supra note 22, at 13. In general, an
accommodation is any change in work environment that enables individuals with
disabilities to have the same employment opportunities as non-disabled individu-
als. Id. The EEOC defines "reasonable accommodation" as:
I) Modifications or adjustments to a job application process that enable a
qualified applicant with a disability to be considered for the position such
qualified applicant desires; or
II) Modifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to the man-
ner or circumstances under which the position held or desired is custom-
arily performed, that enable a qualified individual with a disability to per-
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impose an "undue hardship."57 Absent a showing of undue hard-
ship, however, the ADA forbids denying employment to an other-
wise qualified individual with a disability if the denial is based on
the need to make reasonable accommodations. 58
These concepts and requirements of the ADA find their origin
in the Rehabilitation Act. Section 794 of the Rehabilitation Act
prohibits discrimination against "otherwise qualified" individuals
with disabilities by federally-funded programs or activities.59 Both
the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA serve largely to shift burdens
of proof in adjudication. Generally, once the plaintiff establishes a
prima facie case of discrimination,60 the burden shifts to the em-
form the essential functions of that position; or
III) Modifications or adjustments that enable a covered entity's employee
with a disability to enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment as
are enjoyed by its other similarly situated employees without disabilities.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1).
For clarification of the "reasonable accommodation" requirement, see the Ap-
pendix to Title 29's implementing regulations. It notes, "[wihile the ADA focuses
on eradicating barriers, the ADA does not relieve a disabled employee or applicant
from the obligation to perform the essential functions of the job." 29 C.F.R. app. §
1630. The background comment continues, "[t]o the contrary, the ADA is intended
to enable disabled persons to compete in the workplace based on the same per-
formance standards and requirements that employers expect of persons who are
not disabled." Id. An accommodation need not be the "best" one possible as long
as it permits the employee to perform the essential job functions. See Kass, supra
note 22, at 13.
57. An accommodation of the disability is not required when it will impose an
"undue hardship" on the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). See also Clark,
supra note 24, at 608 (stating that employers must accommodate the known limi-
tations unless the accommodation would impose an undue hardship).
"Undue hardship" is defined as an action requiring significant difficulty and
expense. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 1 6 3 0. 2 (p)(1). Factors to be consid-
ered when determining whether an accommodation is an undue hardship include:
nature and net cost of the accommodation, overall financial resources of the entity
providing the accommodation and the type of operations of the covered entity. 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2). See also Evan J. Kemp, Jr. & Christopher G. Bell, A Labor
Lawyer's Guide to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 15 NOVA L. REV. 31,
59-62 (1991) (discussing legislative history behind "undue hardship" provision).
In addition to the "undue hardship" defense, the ADA incorporates other de-
fenses such as business necessity, direct threat to the health and safety of others,
religious beliefs and infectious and communicable disease transmission when
dealing with a food handling job. Albrecht, supra note 27, at 24.
58. The statutory text provides: "the term 'discriminate' includes ... denying
employment opportunities to a job applicant or employee who is an otherwise
qualified individual with a disability, if such denial is based on the need of such
covered entity to make reasonable accommodation to the physical or mental im-
pairments of the employee or applicant." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(B).
59. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994). In the employment context, a disabled individ-
ual is "otherwise qualified" under the Rehabilitation Act if he or she can perform
the essential functions of a position with or without reasonable accommodation on
the part of the employer. School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287
n.17 (1987) (citation omitted).
60. A prima facie case is established under the ADA guidelines by proving the
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ployer to show: (1) it reasonably accommodated the employee,
(2) the reasonable accommodation imposed an "undue hardship"61
on the employer or (3) the employee was not otherwise qualified
for the job. 62
As applied to the context of an addict seeking employment,
the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act consider persons who com-
plete drug rehabilitation programs and who do not currently use
illegal drugs to be individuals with disabilities. 63 Thus, if a former
drug addict has been released from a rehabilitation program and is
otherwise qualified to perform all the essential functions of the job
with or without reasonable accommodation by the employer, the
employer may not discriminate against that individual.6 4
employee: 1) has a disability, 2) is qualified or would be qualified with reasonable
accommodation by the employer and 3) was discriminated against by her employer
because of the disability. Flynn, supra note 23, at 2013. See also supra note 41
(describing how a prima facie case of discrimination is established according to the
Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)). The
employer can also plead a few limited defenses such as direct threats to safety and
health and religious exemptions. Id. See also supra notes 56-58 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the additional defenses of undue hardship).
61. For a discussion of the employer's duty to reasonably accommodate unless
the accommodation imposes an undue hardship on the employer, see supra note
57. See also 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(a) (1995); 29 C.F.R. § 1613.704(a) (1995). Factors to
be considered in determination of whether imposing undue hardship by imposing
duty of reasonable accommodations include: (1) the size and type of program in-
volved, (2) the nature of the accommodation and (3) the cost of the accommodation.
45 C.F.R. § 84.12(c); 29 C.F.R. § 1613.704(c). For a critical view of the administra-
tive difficulties resulting from this duty of reasonable accommodation unless an
undue hardship can be shown, particularly with respect to small business persons,
see Jack Anderson and Michael Binstein, ADA Compliance: A Hammer Over Small
Businesses, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Feb. 16, 1994, at Cll.
62. See Wallace v. Veterans Admin., 683 F. Supp. 758, 765 (D. Kan. 1988)
(explaining that once nurse plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of handicap dis-
crimination, the burden shifts to the governmental employer to prove that admin-
istering narcotics is an "essential" function of an ICU nurse).
63. Thomas P. Murphy, Disabilities Discrimination Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 36 CATH. LAW. 13, 22 (1995). See also 42 U.S.C. § 12114(b)
(including as qualified persons with disabilities individuals who have successfully
completed a drug rehabilitation program). The statutory text provides:
Nothing in subsection (a) of this section shall be construed to exclude as a
qualified individual with a disability an individual who-
(1) has successfully completed a supervised drug rehabilitation pro-
gram and is no longer engaging in the illegal use of drugs, or has oth-
erwise been rehabilitated successfully and is no longer engaging in
such use;
(2) is participating in a supervised rehabilitation program and is no
longer engaging in such use.
Id. For similar language in the Rehabilitation Act, see 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(C)(ii).
64. Murphy, supra note 63, at 22. Murphy also provides an example: If a re-
formed drug addict applied for a teaching position at a parochial school, and the
applicant is otherwise qualified to perform all essential functions of the position,
the diocese or school board may, as a reasonable accommodation, have to allow the
individual to leave every day at noon to go to a methadone clinic, to come in a little
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D. Judicial Failure to Recognize Subtle Differences in
"Current Use" Provisions of the Rehabilitation Act and
the ADA
Turning from disability discrimination in the employment
arena generally to disability discrimination against addicts specifi-
cally, the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA treat the use of illegal
drugs differently from the use of alcohol.65 For example, the ADA
defines a "drug" as a "controlled substance" as defined by sched-
ules I through V of section 202 of the Controlled Substances Act,
without mentioning alcohol.66 The ADA prohibits "controlled sub-
stances" from "current" use,67 but does not forbid the consumption
later than the other teachers or maybe leave a little early because he tires easily
in the first six months of rehabilitation. Id. "Only by demonstrating that this type
of accommodation is 'unreasonable' and would [be] an undue hardship on the
school can the school defend not providing the accommodation." Id. at 22-23.
65. See id. at 23 ("Alcoholism is treated differently from drug use under the
ADA."). Unlike the current use of illegal drugs, the current use of alcohol is not
prohibited by the ADA. Id. Thus, if an employee's "alcoholism does not interfere
with job performance, as an alcoholic, the individual may be protected against dis-
crimination under the ADA." Id. See also Wolverton, supra note 23, at 541-42.
The ADA, however, is inconsistent: "although section 12114 is entitled 'Illegal Use
of Drugs and Alcohol,' the terms 'alcohol' and 'alcoholic' are missing from the sec-
tion's key portions." Id. at 541. Further, subsection (a), which defines an individ-
ual with a disability, excludes persons currently illegally using drugs, but not al-
cohol. Id. "It is only in the subsections pertaining to the authority of the employer
and to transportation employees that the term 'alcohol' is used." Id.
Similarly, current drug users are excluded from protection under the Rehabili-
tation Act, which states that only alcoholics whose current use of alcohol prevents
them from performing the duties of the job lose Rehabilitation Act protection. 29
U.S.C. § 708(8)(C)(v); see also supra note 26 and accompanying text. Under the
Rehabilitation Act, Congress intended to require federal employers "to exert sub-
stantial affirmative efforts to assist alcoholic employees toward overcoming their
handicap before firing them for performance deficiencies related to drinking." Ad-
ams, supra note 24, at 110 (citing Whitlock v. Donovon, 598 F. Supp. 126 (D.D.C.
1984), affd 790 F.2d 964 (1986) (stating that reasonable accommodation means an
employer must offer an alcoholic employee the "firm choice" between treatment
and discipline before any disciplinary action may be taken)). Thus it appears that
those persons who currently use alcohol, but who can still perform their jobs, are
protected by law, whereas all current drug users lose such protection even if they
can still perform their jobs.
While the illegality of controlled substances makes their use different in many
ways from the use of alcohol, the ADA's and the Rehabilitation Act's treatment of
these mood-altering substances should not reflect these social and legal differ-
ences. Drug and alcohol use both create addiction. That is the only factor relevant
to the discussion of-such use in these Acts because they are meant to protect indi-
viduals with disabilities, not to set social and legal standards of acceptable con-
duct.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(6)(B).
67. See id. § 12114(a). The statute provides: "For purposes of this subchapter,
the term 'qualified individual with a disability' shall not include any employee or
applicant who is currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs, when the covered
entity acts on the basis of such use." Id. Thus, the ADA clearly states that an in-
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of alcohol in this manner.68 Although drug use and alcohol use are
treated differently by the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, courts
interpreting these statutes have blurred the distinction by failing
to recognize or even acknowledge the differences. Instead, courts
have excluded the current use of both illegal drugs and alcohol
from protection as a disability under both the Rehabilitation Act
and the ADA.69 Thus, although the ADA and the Rehabilitation
Act do not explicitly forbid current alcohol consumption as they do
for current illegal drug use,70 courts interpret the Acts as if they
forbid the current consumption of alcohol as well. 71
Failure to recognize the statutory distinction between the
current use of drugs and the current use of alcohol becomes par-
ticularly relevant in the context of addiction. Actions resulting
from an addiction to alcohol are protected in a manner that actions
resulting from a drug addiction are not. For example, suppose an
alcoholic employee is arrested at night for public drunkenness due
to the "current" use of alcohol, and is not a threat to the safety of
his or her office at the time. 72 Arguably, the ADA and the Reha-
bilitation Act should protect the employee against termination re-
sulting from the incident. First, the employee's drunken status
dividual who is currently using illegal drugs is not a "qualified individual with a
disability," and is not entitled to protection under the ADA. Murphy, supra note
63, at 22. Moreover,
the term 'currently' does not require the employer to prove the individual
illegally used drugs at the time of the action. The act is intended to deny
protection to an individual whose illegal use of drugs 'occurred recently
enough to justify a reasonable belief that the person's drug use is current.
Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.3 (1994)).
68. Murphy, supra note 63, at 23; see also Samuel Estreicher, The Americans
With Disabilities Act: A Guide for Practitioners, 208 N.Y.L.J. 1, 7 (1992) ("By con-
trast [to users of illegal drugs], the ADA does not expressly exclude current alco-
holics from coverage.").
69. See Collings v. Longview Fibre Co., 63 F.3d 828 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding
termination due to current drug use in claim brought under the ADA). Cf. Maddox
v. University of Tenn., 62 F.3d 843 (6th Cir. 1995) (explaining the court's view that
the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA provide no protection for alcoholics' current
use of alcohol).
70. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
71. Although courts have not directly spoken to protection of current use of
alcohol, current users of alcohol are nonetheless, in effect, unprotected because
courts use "conduct" and "not otherwise qualified" to deprive alcoholics of protec-
tion under the Acts. See Maddox, 62 F.3d at 843 (upholding a termination for cur-
rent alcohol use in a claim brought under both the Rehabilitation Act and the
ADA); Altman v. New York City Health and Hosp. Corp., 904 F. Supp. 503
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (upholding a hospital's refusal to reinstate its chief of internal
medicine due to current alcohol use).
72. See 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(C)(v) (1994). This provision of the Rehabilitation
Act exempts from protection any employee who "is an alcoholic whose ... employ-
ment, by reason of such current alcohol abuse, would constitute a direct threat to
property or the safety of others." Id.
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was caused by alcoholism, a protected disability. Second, the ADA
and the Rehabilitation Act do not explicitly remove the "current
use" of alcohol by employees from protection. However, the
"current" use of an illegal drug clearly does remove an addict em-
ployee from protection.73 Thus, an addicted employee currently
using alcohol has greater protection under the Acts than a simi-
larly-situated addicted employee currently using illegal drugs.74
This statutory distinction in the treatment of addicts has not been
noted by many federal courts, which have treated all current use
by an addict as unprotected. 75
Because these statutes treat alcoholics differently than drug
addicts, federal courts' uniform treatment of disabled employees
with addictions has been irrational and contrary to congressional
intent. The uniform treatment of drug and alcohol addicts who are
also current users becomes significant when arguing for statutory
reform. Because the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act were meant
to protect individuals with disabilities, it seems inconsistent that
the Acts should uniformly deny protection to drug addicts, rather
than uniformly protect both drug and alcohol addicts. 76
II. The Federal Case Law
With an overview of the statutory provisions of the ADA and
the Rehabilitation Act as background, this analysis turns to the
federal judiciary's treatment of the two Acts and their protection of
addicts. Federal district and circuit courts have treated ADA and
Rehabilitation Act cases identically in analyzing whether a prima
facie case has been established and whether the addict should be
afforded protection. 77 This parallel treatment, however, has led to
a line of holdings and standards that give employers and lower
courts little guidance and addicted employees little security.
73. Id. § 706(8)(C)(i).
74. Murphy, supra note 63, at 23.
75. See Maddox v. University of Tenn., 62 F.3d 843 (6th Cir. 1995) (upholding
termination of alcoholic football coach for public intoxication and driving under the
influence of alcohol after hours).
76. See Kass, supra note 22, at 2 n.2 (commenting on the expansive protection
of the ADA).
77. For a discussion of the preference of federal courts to adjudicate Rehabili-




A. Employer Reliance and Prima Facie Discrimination
Federal courts adjudicate Rehabilitation Act and ADA claims
under the same framework and apply similar standards to cases
involving claims arising under the Acts. 78 In deciding Rehabilita-
tion Act and ADA claims under these standards, federal courts
have identified two types of cases: (1) cases where the employer
disclaims any reliance on the employee's disability in its employ-
ment discretion and decision-making and (2) cases where the em-
ployer acknowledges reliance on the disability. 79 By classifying a
case as one or the other, federal courts determine the appropriate
burden of proof to apply in disability discrimination suits.
In cases where the employer disclaims reliance on the dis-
ability when taking action against an employee, federal courts
employ the same analysis used in actions brought under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.80 Applying this analysis to the em-
ployment disability discrimination context, an employee has the
final burden of proving the employer's reason for the action was
actually a pretext for discrimination and that the action had a dis-
parate impact on that disabled employer.8 1
A different analysis applies in the case where an employer
acknowledges reliance on the disability in taking adverse action
against an employee. A disability may be a permissible factor to
consider with respect to the employee's qualifications. An em-
ployer may consider an employee's disability when the limitations
make the employee unqualified to perform all of the essential
78. For a discussion of this preference for treating ADA and Rehabilitation
cases under similar standards and frameworks, see supra note 23.
79. For an example of this analysis with respect to a claim brought under the
Rehabilitation Act, see Teahan v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 951 F.2d 511, 511
(2d Cir. 1991) (holding employer terminated employee "solely by reason of" his
disability, even though the employer disclaimed any reliance on the employee's
disability, when behavior relied on is causally related to that disability). For an
example of this analysis applied to a case brought under the ADA, see Ennis v. Na-
tional Ass'n of Business and Education Radio, 53 F.3d 55 (4th Cir. 1995) (applying
framework used in Rehabilitation Act cases and other discrimination claims to
ADA claims as well). See also Teahan, 951 F.2d at 511 and Ham v. Nevada, 788 F.
Supp. 455 (D. Nev. 1992) (describing generally the two branches of analysis used
in labor discrimination claims under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA).
80. Teahan, 951 F.2d at 514 (finding McDonnell Douglas Title VII analysis ap-
propriate when employer disclaimed reliance on the disability in the context of
Rehabilitation Act claims). For the McDonnell Douglas standard for finding a
prima facie case of racial discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, see supra note 41.
81. For application of the McDonnell Douglas analysis to claims brought under
the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, see supra note 41.
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functions of the job.82 Although an employer may permissibly take
into account a disability, once a prima facie case of discrimination
is shown, the employer is required to rebut the inference that the
disability was improperly considered. Rebuttal is accomplished by
demonstrating that the reliance on the disability was relevant to
the job qualifications.8 3 The disabled plaintiff, however, "still
bears the ultimate burden of proving that despite his disability, he
is qualified."84
As a threshold question, classifying a case as one type or the
other is important. Typically, an employer acknowledges reliance
on the employee's disability as a permissible and appropriate fac-
tor to consider with respect to employee qualifications when iaking
adverse action such as termination.8 5 The difficult cases are those
of the first type, where an employer disclaims reliance on the dis-
ability but the employee contends that the conduct resulting in
termination was caused by his disability. In these cases the em-
ployee contends the employer did indeed rely impermissibly on the
disability in terminating the employee. 86 Once an employee es-
tablishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden is placed
on the employer to justify the dismissal. This shifting burden is
meant to prevent employers from justifying dismissal by citing
misconduct related to a type of disability, thereby "avoiding the
82. In Teahan, 951 F.2d at 514-15, the court held that section 504 of the Reha-
bilitation Act allows employers to make decisions based upon the job-related at-
tributes of a person's disability, and that Title VII disparate treatment analysis is
applicable where the employee's disability is an appropriate factor to consider with
respect to his qualifications. Id. Nonetheless, the qualifications being judged can-
not be directly related to a disability unless the employer proves that the disability
in essence renders the employee unqualified to fill the job. See also Alicia H.
Apfel, Cast Adrift: Homeless Mentally Ill, Alcoholic and Drug Addicted, 44 CATH.
U. L. REV. 551, 564 (1995) (noting that "[t]reatment of intentional discrimination
against disabled persons differs from other types of discrimination, such as race
discrimination, in that an individual's disability may be taken into account when
determining an individual's eligibility"). Id. (footnote omitted). The employer may
have to demonstrate that the disability factors were relevant to the essential eligi-
bility requirements for the position. Id.
83. See Ham, 788 F. Supp. at 457-58. The Ham court found that the defen-
dant, the State of Nevada, relied on the employee's alcoholism when terminating
him from his position as Chief of Nevada Bureau of Alcohol and Drug Abuse for
driving while intoxicated. Id. Thus, the state had the burden of showing the em-
ployee was "not qualified to hold his position." Id. at 458.
84. See id. at 457 (quoting Teahan v. Metro-North Commuter R.R, 951 F.2d.
511, 514-15 (2d Cir. 1991)).
85. See id. at 457 (citing Teahan, 951 F.2d at 514-15).
86. See, e.g., Teahan, 951 F.2d at 514.
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burden of proving that the handicap is relevant" to the job re-
quirements. 87
B. The Effect of Addiction on Conduct and Its Statutory
Protection
In adjudicating Rehabilitation Act and ADA discrimination
claims brought by drug addicts and alcoholics, a key distinction
has surfaced in the way courts characterize conduct associated
with addiction. The issue of whether to recognize or reject a dis-
tinction between the disability of addiction, and conduct related to
that addiction, has created a split between the Second and Sixth
Circuits.8 8 In addition, federal circuit jurisdictions other than the
Second and the Sixth favor either recognition or rejection as well,
making the split even more important.8 9 The federal district and
circuit courts treatment of employment discrimination cases
brought by addicts, while favoring either recognition or rejection of
the disability/conduct distinction generally, has established a spec-
trum of holdings and standards. 90 While these scattered holdings
incorporate (in part or in whole) this disability/conduct dichotomy,
the cases are often decided on their specific facts or for underlying
policy reasons, leaving the holdings hollow as precedents to be ap-
plied in later cases.91
1. Rejecting the Addiction/Conduct Distinction
In 1991, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in Teahan v.
Metro-North Commuter Railroad,92 held that a Rehabilitation Act
plaintiff can show that he was fired "solely by reason of" his dis-
ability, or at least create a genuine issue of material fact, if he can
show the termination was causally related to his disability.93 In
87. Id. at 517.
88. On August 21, 1995, the Sixth Circuit explicitly declined to follow the rea-
soning of the Second Circuit in Teahan, 951 F.2d at 511. Maddox v. University of
Tenn., 62 F.3d 843, 847 (6th Cir. 1995).
89. For treatment by other federal circuit courts, see infra Parts II.B.1-2.
90. See infra Part II.B.3.
91. For a discussion of the fact-bound holdings of appellate courts, see infra
Parts II.B.1-2. See also infra Part III.A (discussing the substantive importance of
the burden shifting characteristic of the disability/conduct distinction).
92. 951 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1991).
93. Id. at 517. 'The 'solely by reason of' inquiry is intended to ascertain which
employer decisions are based on conduct or circumstance that are causally unre-
lated to the handicap, and thus, outside the protective sweep of section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act." Id. at 516.
While Teahan, 951 F.2d 511, was later remanded, dismissed and the dismissal
affirmed, the substance of the Second Circuit's original decision regarding termi-
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Teahan, the defendant was fired for excessive absenteeism caused
by his alcoholism. 94 The Second Circuit held for the employee, re-
jecting the district court's distinction between misconduct
(absenteeism) and the disabling condition of alcoholism. 95 The
court presumed that Teahan's absenteeism may have resulted
from his alcoholism.96 The court held that termination by an em-
ployer justified as due to conduct "shown to be caused by sub-
stance abuse is termination 'solely by reason of' that substance
abuse for purposes of § 504."97 Thus, one's disability should not be
distinguished from its effects in determining whether one was
fired "solely by reason of" the disability.
In Despears v. Milwaukee County,98 the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals supported the Teahan holding by rejecting the
distinction between addiction and conduct.99 In Despears, the
plaintiff filed suit under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act for
being demoted to a lower-paying job after he lost his driver's li-
cense because of repeated convictions for driving under the influ-
ence of alcohol.100 While affirming summary judgment in favor of
the defendants, the court noted that the increased likelihood of an
alcoholic losing his driver's license as compared to a non-alcoholic
was enough to show a causal relation between Despears' alcohol-
nations of addicts and their rejection of the distinction between misconduct and
the disability of addiction remains unchanged. See Teahan v. Metro-North Com-
muter R.R., 80 F.3d 50, 51 (2d Cir. 1996). Thus, the subsequent history of Mr.
Teahan's claim (complaint dismissed for failure to show he was "otherwise quali-
fied") is treated here only summarily. See id. The Second Circuit noted that on
remand the district court found Teahan's termination to be "solely by reason of'
his disability of alcoholism even though the employer disclaimed any reliance on
the disability and that it relied on the conduct itself (excessive absenteeism) as
caused by, or as a job-related manifestation of, the disability. Id. at 52. The court
also noted that on remand the district court was guided directly by the first Tea-
han case (case analyzed in this Note) because it specifically addressed the "solely
by reason of" issue. Id. Thus, the Seventh Circuit re-affirmed its position reject-
ing the conduct/disability distinction. Id.
94. Teahan, 951 F.2d at 513.
95. Id. at 516-17.
96. Id. at 515. The defendant's summary judgment motion caused the court to
examine the facts in the light most favorable to Teahan, and thus assume the exis-
tence of a causal relationship between his alcoholism and the absenteeism. Id.
97. Id. at 517. The court also noted, however, that "if the consequences of the
handicap are such that the employee is not qualified for the position, then a firing
because of the handicap is not discriminatory, even though the firing is 'solely by
reason of the handicap." Id. at 516.
98. 63 F.3d 635 (7th Cir. 1995).
99. Id. at 637.
100. Id. at 635. Despears worked initially as a maintenance worker, a job which
involved occasional driving. Id. Upon his fourth conviction for driving under the
influence of alcohol, Despears was demoted to the lower-paying position of custo-
dian, a job which involved no driving. Id.
[Vol. 15:157
PROTECTING ADDICTS
ism and his demotion.101 The court held that although alcoholism
could be an impermissible cause for his demotion under the ADA
and the Rehabilitation Act, in this case alcoholism was not the
"compulsion" or "sole cause" for the demotion. 02 The court noted
that the alcoholism must be such a compulsion or sole cause "to
form the bridge that Despears seeks to construct between his alco-
holism and his demotion." 103 Therefore, while the plaintiff estab-
lished no "sole cause" connection, the court rejected the distinction
between addiction and conduct caused solely by that disability by
implying that if alcoholism were the "sole cause" of his misconduct,
it would be a discriminatory violation of the ADA and the Reha-
bilitation Act to fire him as a result of that conduct. 104
2. Recognizing the Addiction/Conduct Distinction
In 1995, in Maddox v. University of Tennessee,105 the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals declined to follow the Second Circuit's
reasoning in Teahan.10 6 In Maddox, the University of Tennessee's
assistant football coach was fired as a result of being arrested for
public disorderly conduct due to his drunkenness. 07 The coach
was an alcoholic, and he relied on Teahan to argue that his mis-
conduct was "solely by reason of" his disabling condition. 108 The
Maddox court held that the correct analysis centered on the dis-
tinction between discharging someone for unacceptable miscon-
duct and discharging someone because of his addiction disabil-
ity.109
To support its disability/misconduct distinction, the Maddox
court relied on Taub v. Frank,"0 a First Circuit case. The Taub
decision held the connection between drug addiction and addic-
tion-related drug possession for distribution was too attenuated to
afford protection to the addict."' While the court acknowledged a
101. Id. at 636.
102. Id. The court stated that another cause of his being convicted of drunk
driving was his decision to drive while drunk. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. 62 F.3d 843 (6th Cir. 1995).
106. Id. at 847.
107. Id. at 845.
108. Id. at 847.
109. Id.
110. 957 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1992).
111. Id. at 11. The facts in Taub, however, made that case much easier to rule
on than Teahan or Maddox. In Taub, a Postal Service employee was convicted of
possessing and distributing heroin, a portion of which he distributed to other
Postal Service employees. Id. at 9. The First Circuit held that "[wihatever force
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disability/misconduct distinction on the facts of that case, the court
did not wholly recognize the distinction as later asserted by the
court in Maddox.112 The First Circuit focused on the drug distribu-
tion actions of the defendant, not the addiction or the posses-
sion.113
To further bolster its holding, the Maddox court also cited
Little v. FBI,114 a Fourth Circuit decision which acknowledged the
disability/conduct distinction." 5 The Little court held that no Re-
habilitation Act protection was available to an alcoholic employee
who relapsed from a rehabilitation program and was intoxicated
while on duty. 116 However, both the ADA and the Rehabilitation
Acts clearly prohibit protection for this type of conduct while at
work; thus, the facts determine the holding much more clearly
than in Teahan or Maddox, where the conduct was not specifically
forbidden by the Acts. 117
there may be in the contention that Taub's heroin addiction, and addiction-related
criminal possession of heroin, fit] would not remove him from the protection of the
Act, [because it] is simply too attenuated when extended to encompass an addic-
tion-related possession of heroin for distribution." Id. at 11.
112. Maddox v. University of Tenn., 62 F.3d 843, 847 (6th Cir. 1995)
113. Taub, 957 F.2d at 11.
114. 1 F.3d 255 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that termination resulting from an FBI
employee's misconduct of driving while intoxicated and off-duty was not caused by
his alcoholism), cited in Maddox, 62 F.3d at 847. But see Cottrell, supra note 17, at
1753-54 (characterizing Little differently than the Maddox court, calling it the
"latest installment in a line of judicial interpretations of the [Rehabilitation Act]
focusing on the needs of the employers and narrowing the Act's protection for indi-
viduals with disabilities").
115. See generally Cottrell, supra note 17 (discussing the holding of the cases
recognizing the distinction between disability and misconduct (specifically Little)).
Cottrell comments:
Although the [Rehabilitation Act] clearly does not require employers to
endure ineffective and potentially dangerous employees regardless of the
failure of treatment, dismissing an employee for a single incident of mis-
conduct without providing an opportunity for treatment may undermine
the purpose of the [Rehabilitation Act]: to help disabled individuals par-
ticipate in the workplace.
Id. at 1766-67.
116. 1 F.3d at 255. Although the Little decision would appear to support the
Maddox decision by holding that an FBI agent was fired for misconduct rather
than his disability of alcoholism, the facts in Little were that a special agent with
the FBI, while undergoing treatment for alcoholism, relapsed into alcohol abuse
and was intoxicated while on duty and while at work, again making these facts
easier on which to rule. Id. at 256.
117. See 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c) (1994) (ADA allows an employer to prohibit illegal
use of drugs and alcohol at the workplace); 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(c)(v) (1994) (stating
that Rehabilitation Act protection against discrimination does not include any em-
ployee whose current use of alcohol prevents job performance or is a threat to the
property or safety of others).
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3. The Spectrum of Employment Discrimination Case
Holdings
As demonstrated by the cases above, there exists a spectrum
of conduct covered by courts adjudicating claims brought under
the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. Some addiction-related con-
duct is found to be protected by all courts; other conduct is forbid-
den from protection by all courts. The vast majority of addiction-
related conduct affecting the workplace, however, does not clearly
fall into these "clearly protected" or "clearly unprotected" catego-
ries, thus establishing a spectrum of protected conduct that courts
may or may not protect.
At one end of the spectrum is addiction-related behavior that
is clearly protected by all courts under the Rehabilitation Act and
the ADA. For example, the status of being an alcoholic or drug
addict is not a proper basis for discrimination in the workplace in
and of itself under both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. 1 8
118. The ADA and the Rehabilitation Act protect addicts participating in reha-
bilitation programs and addicts who have completed such programs from discrimi-
nation based on that status in the employment sector. The ADA provides:
Illegal use of drugs and alcohol
(a) Qualified individual with a disability
For purposes of this subchapter, the term "qualified individual
with a disability" shall not include any employee or applicant who is
currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs, when the covered entity
acts on the basis of such use.
(b) Rules of construction
Nothing in subsection (a) of this section shall be construed to ex-
clude as a qualified individual with a disability an individual who-
(1) has successfully completed a supervised drug rehabilitation
program and is no longer engaging in the illegal use of drugs, or
has otherwise been rehabilitated successfully and is no longer
engaging in such use; [or]
(2) is participating in a supervised rehabilitation program and is
no longer engaging in such use; ...
except that it shall not be a violation of this chapter for a covered entity to
adopt or administer reasonable policies or procedures, including but not
limited to drug testing, designed to ensure that an individual described in
paragraph (1) or (2) is no longer engaging in the illegal use of drugs.
42 U.S.C. § 12114. Section 8(C) of the Rehabilitation Act also protects addicts
seeking rehabilitation:
(i)... the term "individual with a disability" does not include an individ-
ual who is currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs, when a covered
entity acts on the basis of such use.
(ii) Nothing in clause (i) shall be construed to exclude as an individual
with a disability an individual who--
(I) has successfully completed a supervised drug rehabilitation program
and is no longer engaging in the illegal use of drugs, or has otherwise
been rehabilitated successfully and is no longer engaging in such use;
(I) is participating in a supervised rehabilitation program and is no
longer engaging in such use; or
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Termination due to an employee's attendance at an Alcoholics
Anonymous meeting or Narcotics Anonymous meeting in the eve-
ning, on an employee's own time, would be a discriminatory viola-
tion of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.119 An employer cannot
fire or refuse to hire an employee solely on the basis of his or her
status as a recovering addict who is no longer engaging in the use
of drugs or alcohol. 120
At the other end of the spectrum is addiction-related behavior
that is clearly not protected under the Rehabilitation Act and the
ADA. For example, employees who admit to illegal drug use while
at work and while on duty are clearly not protected from termina-
tion actions. 121
Due to its prevalence in employment discrimination actions,
behavior between these two extremes is most important to the dis-
position of addiction-related Rehabilitation Act and ADA cases.
The cases described in Subsection 2 and other federal circuit court
adjudication of the Acts comprise the middle of the "conduct-
covered" spectrum. Examples of addiction-related conduct for
which employers have lawfully terminated employees include:
driving while intoxicated while off duty,122 illegal drug use while
off duty by a police officer in a department that assigned alcoholics
to a rehabilitation program as a "reasonable accommodation" of
(III) is erroneously regarded as engaging in such use, but is not en-
gaging in such use;
except that it shall not be a violation of this chapter for a covered entity to
adopt or administer reasonable policies or procedures, including but not
limited to drug testing, designed to ensure that an individual described in
paragraph (I) or (II) is no longer engaging in the illegal use of drugs.
29 U.S.C. § 706.
119. See 42 U.S.C. § 12114(b) (protecting employees who have completed or are
participating in a drug rehabilitation program); 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(C)(ii)
(protecting employees who have completed or are participating in a drug rehabili-
tation program). See statutory text supra note 118.
120. See Wallace v. Veterans Admin., 683 F. Supp. 758 (D. Kan. 1988) (holding
it was a violation of the Rehabilitation Act to refuse to hire a registered nurse who
was a recovering addict and was otherwise qualified for an ICU position when she
had completed a rehabilitation program, was no longer a current user, had been
drug-free for over nine months and had informed prospective employer of her dis-
ability); see also supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text (explaining the facts of
Wallace).
121. See Collings v. Longview Fibre Co., 63 F.3d 828 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding
that terminated employees at a box manufacturing plant who admitted to illegal
drug use while at work and while on duty are not protected and were not wrong-
fully terminated). See also 42 U.S.C. § 12114(a); 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(C)(i) (stating
the statutory texts of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act exempting "current" us-
ers of illegal drugs from protection).
122. See Despears v. Milwaukee County, 63 F.3d 635 (7th Cir. 1995); Maddox v.
University of Tenn., 62 F.3d 843 (6th Cir. 1995).
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their condition, 123 driving intoxicated while off duty and coming to
work intoxicated 124 and possessing illegal drugs with the intent to
distribute heroin to fellow postal employees. 125
This spectrum of fact-bound holdings leave courts and em-
ployers with little guidance and addict employees with little secu-
rity. A clearer, brighter line delineating protection for addiction
and addiction-related conduct should be drawn for the benefit of
disabled addict employees, affected employers and the courts ad-
judicating discrimination claims. Along this spectrum of cases up-
holding employee terminations, a point exists to draw a clear line
and establish a new workable standard for addict discrimination
claims brought under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.
III. Reversing the Trend Toward Decreased Protection of
Addicts Under the Rehabilitation Act and the
Americans with Disabilities Act
After examining the case law to date on discrimination claims
brought by addicts under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, the
analysis turns to judicial and statutory reform that may make the
employment sector and the federal court system substantially
more protective and predictable for disabled addicts with legiti-
mate discrimination claims. This section argues for increased ju-
dicial rejection of the disability/conduct distinction and for changes
in employment discrimination legislation to focus on protecting
disabled addicts. Changing the focus of employment discrimina-
tion law concerning addicts from persecution to protection and
preservation will turn the tide of intolerance toward a river of re-
habilitation.
A. Judicial Reform
The "conduct-covered" spectrum discussed above demon-
strates a federal judicial trend toward intolerance of drug and al-
cohol addiction, making protection for those suffering from the
disability of addiction more difficult to receive under the ADA and
the Rehabilitation Act. The federal courts should reverse this
trend by focusing on and reiterating the legislative intent behind
the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act: to protect individuals with
disabilities from discrimination. 126
123. See Copeland v. Philadelphia Police Dep't, 840 F.2d 1139 (3d Cir. 1988).
124. See Little v. FBI, 1 F.3d 255 (8th Cir. 1993).
125. See Taub v. Frank, 957 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1992).
126. For the statutory purposes of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, see su-
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As a first step toward reversing the intolerance trend, federal
courts should support and follow the example of those courts re-
jecting the distinction between addiction and conduct caused by
the addiction. 127 A federal court finding that misconduct and the
addiction that caused it cannot be separated performs two func-
tions, one procedural and the other substantive. Procedurally, this
rejection of the conduct/disability distinction makes it easier for
employees to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under
the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. The third element of a prima
facie case under the Rehabilitation Act is a demonstration that
"[tihe plaintiff is being excluded from participation in, being de-
nied benefits of, or being subjected to discrimination under the
program solely by reason of his [disability]." 28 Thus, courts re-
jecting the disability/conduct distinction note that an employer
may rely on a disability in terminating an employee without ex-
plicitly stating they are relying on the disability. 129 This reliance
shifts the burden to the employer, even though the employer dis-
claims any reliance on the disability, because the relevant question
is what conduct the employer points to in terminating the em-
ployee. If the conduct justifying the termination is caused solely
by the disability, whether the employer claims reliance on the dis-
pra note 20. Both intend to protect "individuals with disabilities." 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101 (1994) ; 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1994). Cottrell criticizes the line of cases recog-
nizing the distinction between disability and conduct and commenting:
The practice of some courts in finding that "misconduct" obviates the need
for a "reasonable accommodation" analysis denies an employee whose ad-
diction causes misbehavior on the job the protection of the Act, even
though he may be a far more likely candidate for successful rehabilitation
than a more discreet drinker. Such a result reflects societal notions of the
blameworthiness of alcoholics, as many people believe that people who ar-
rive at work drunk deserve to be fired. This result seems incongruous,
however, when placed in the context of the expansive goals of the
[Rehabilitation Act], because it denies help to those who may need it most.
In other words, the practice of allowing outright dismissal whenever alco-
holism results in misconduct at the workplace excuses employers from
their [Rehabilitation Act] duty to provide reasonable accommodation to
their employees, simply because the employee's handicap manifests itself
at work .... [If] one adopts the view that the [Rehabilitation Act] was in-
tended to create a greater level of tolerance for alcoholic employees in or-
der to encourage rehabilitation before dismissal becomes the only avail-
able option, then the result of the Little line of cases becomes disturbing.
Cottrell, supra note 17, at 1767.
127. See Despears, 63 F.3d at 636; Teahan v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 951
F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1991). For a discussion of the Despears holding, see supra notes
98-104 and accompanying text.
128. Doherty v. S. College of Optometry, 862 F.2d 570, 573 (6th Cir. 1988),
quoted in Maddox v. University of Tenn., 62 F.3d 843, 846 (6th Cir. 1995).
129. See Teahan, 951 F.2d at 516-17.
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ability or not, the employer has indeed improperly relied on the
disability in violation of the Rehabilitation Act.130
This burden-shifting characteristic of the conduct/disability
performs a second and more substantive role as well: it reflects an
underlying principle of protection for disabled and diseased indi-
viduals who have been shunned and chastised by the legal com-
munity and greater society for too long. As the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals noted in Teahan, the difficulty of allowing courts
to divorce a disability from the conduct it causes is that it allows
an employer to .'rely' on any conduct or circumstance that is a
manifestation or symptomatic of a [disability], and, in so doing,
avoid the burden of proving that the [disability] is relevant to the
job qualifications."'131 Thus, federal courts have recognized that
conduct that does not affect one's job qualifications or one's daily
abilities to perform on-the-job tasks should not be the basis for
termination without a showing of reasonable accommodation re-
sulting in an undue hardship. 132
Along the spectrum of facts and holdings discussed in the
cases above, a new standard should be established that will pro-
vide protection against discrimination for addicts and also ade-
quately guide courts in determining whether specific conduct
should be protected by the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. This
new standard would force courts to ask two questions in deter-
mining whether conduct is protected: (1) whether the conduct af-
fects the workplace, and (2) whether the conduct is directly caused
by the addiction or is secondary in nature.
The first inquiry is important because employers have no le-
gitimate interest in making decisions based on conduct that does
not affect the workplace. Therefore, if the conduct in question
does not affect the workplace, the individual should be protected
as disabled and any termination due to such conduct should be a
130. See id. The Second Circuit provides the following example of the above
discussion for purposes of clarification:
An employee has one leg shorter than the other, causing him to limp,
which we assume is a "handicap" under § 504. The limp causes the
worker to make a loud "thump" when he takes a step. He is fired, his em-
ployer says, because of the thumping. Under the district court's analysis
the employee may not maintain a suit under § 504 because the handicap
is the limp, not the thump; hence the worker was not fired "solely by rea-
son of' his handicap, but rather because of an attribute caused by the
handicap .... [T]he proper analysis is that the causal connection between
the limp (handicap) and the thump (symptomatic manifestation of the
handicap) is such that the employer did "rely" on the handicap.
Id.
131. Id. at 517.
132. See Wallace v. Veterans Admin., 683 F. Supp. 758, 767 (D. Kan. 1988).
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discriminatory violation of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.
To answer the second question, if the conduct does affect the
workplace and is directly caused by the addiction, protection
should be given to the disabled individual. The employee should
be afforded an opportunity to prove he is "otherwise qualified,"
prove that the employer can make "reasonable accommodations" of
the disability, or seek rehabilitatory assistance before termination
actions begin. 133
For example, termination of an employee for being convicted
of driving while intoxicated when not on-duty, like the plaintiffs in
Ham, 134 Despears,13 5 and Maddox,136 should be considered acts of
discrimination in violation of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.
Just as a diabetic who goes into insulin shock at home cannot be
fired for conduct that does not affect work, alcoholics should not be
fired for conduct relating to their disability while not at work. For
example, if an alcoholic employee is a truck driver by profession,
firing that employee for driving while intoxicated on-duty is cer-
tainly an appropriate sanction since the conduct affects the work-
place and is secondary in nature, i.e., not directly caused by the
addiction of alcoholism. That is, although an alcoholic cannot al-
ways fight the compulsion to drink, which is the primary conduct
caused by their addiction, choosing to drink and then get behind
the wheel of a truck is a secondary activity choice.
As alluded to above, focusing on the primary effects of addic-
tion affecting the workplace setting also would mean taking an-
other look at what an employer could do to "reasonably accommo-
date" an addict. Both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act discuss,
in their definitions of "reasonable accommodations," the possibility
of part-time or modified work schedules to make rehabilitation
programs more accessible. 137 Taking another look at these provi-
sions means making them work for drug and alcohol addicts just
133. For a discussion of bringing an employment discrimination case under the
Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, see supra Part I.C.
134. Ham v. Nevada, 788 F. Supp. 455 (D. Nev. 1992).
135. Despears v. Milwaukee County, 63 F.3d 635 (7th Cir. 1995).
136. Maddox v. University of Tenn., 62 F.3d 842 (6th Cir. 1995).
137. The ADA provides, in part, that "reasonable accommodation" may include
"job structuring, part-time or modified work schedules [and] reassignment to a va-
cant position ...." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (1994). In addition, regulations im-
plementing the Rehabilitation Act provide that "[r]easonable accommodation may
include, but shall not be limited to: (1) Making facilities readily accessible to and
usable by [disabled] persons, and (2) Job restructuring, part-time or modified work
schedules, acquisition or modification of equipment .. " 29 C.F.R. § 1613.704(b)
(1995). For an example of a reasonable accommodation accomplished by using a
part-time schedule, see supra note 64.
[Vol. 15:157
PROTECTING ADDICTS
as they can work for those with diabetes, those with mental disor-
ders and those confined to a wheelchair.
Application of this new standard to federal adjudication of
ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims would provide clear guidance
and clarify the role of off-duty conduct in deciding discrimination
cases brought by addicts. Off-duty conduct has no role in adjudi-
cating employment discrimination claims. Further, focusing on
the distinction between on-duty conduct related directly to addic-
tion and on-duty conduct related indirectly to addiction provides a
more focused inquiry for courts. If the conduct is attributable di-
rectly to the addiction, that is, if the conduct is caused by the ad-
diction, then the conduct must be covered as a part of the em-
ployee's disability of addiction. Protecting addicts in the
employment context from being terminated for conduct outside of
the employment setting, and conduct within the employment set-
ting that is directly caused by the employee's addiction, fulfills the
legislative purposes of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act to pro-
tect disabled individuals.138
B. Statutory Reform
As one critic writes, "[a]lcoholism raises analytical problems
that do not fit neatly into the current framework of the ADA and
[the] Rehabilitation Act."139 The language of the ADA must be re-
formed in order to reflect the legislative intent as demonstrated in
its stated purposes. 140 The ADA states as its first purpose, "to pro-
vide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimina-
tion of discrimination against individuals with disabilities,"' 4' and
it invokes the power of congressional authority to enforce the Con-
stitution and address the discrimination faced daily by those with
138. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 701(b). Clark notes that under section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the general focus of courts seems to be on the inter-
est of the federal grantee, rather than on the interests of the employees who suffer
from a disabling addiction. Clark, supra note 24, at 611. Clark notes that courts
have created the dangerous presumption in their interpretation of the Rehabilita-
tion Act that alcoholics who are not in rehabilitation and who are currently using
alcohol are unable to perform their jobs effectively or pose a direct threat to the
safety of property or others. Id. But denying alcoholics who are not rehabilitated
or whose addictions are not "under control" the benefit of being classified as an
"individual with a disability" "altogether undermines a fundamental purpose of the
Act--preventing stigmas associated with disabilities and diseases." Id. at 612.
(emphasis added).
139. Wolverton, supra note 23, at 544.
140. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b). See statutory text supra note 20.
141. Id. § 12101(b)(1).
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disabilities. 142 To bring the provisions of the ADA in line with its
purpose, the ADA should be changed by limiting the "currently
using" exemption 43 to cover addicts only when the addict is
"currently using in the employment. setting." A blanket denial of
protection to addicts contradicts and defeats the stated purpose of
the Act: to eliminate discrimination with respect to addicts.
144
Similarly, the Rehabilitation Act should specifically protect
addicts whose current use does not affect their job performance.
The Rehabilitation Act addresses more specifically the effects of
alcoholism at work than the ADA. The Rehabilitation Act does not
protect anyone whose "current use of alcohol prevents such indi-
vidual from performing the duties of the job in question or whose
employment, by reason of such current alcohol abuse, would con-
stitute a direct threat to property or the safety of others."' 45 The
ADA should adopt this more focused approach to current use and
both Acts should adopt a similar approach in relation to the use of
illegal drugs as well. Focusing on the way alcohol and drug use
affects the work setting makes protection for alcoholics and drug
addicts under the ADA more comprehensive and consistent with
the protection afforded to other disabled individuals under the
ADA. If the ADA was intended to expand the scope of protection
afforded individuals with disabilities, ironically the Rehabilitation
Act offers more protection, in fact, for those who currently use.
146
One key improvement needed in both the ADA and the Re-
habilitation Act is clarity. The scope of the employer's burden to
accommodate alcoholic employees, for example, needs clarification,
as does the weight assigned to the duty of an employer to deter-
mine if an employee is otherwise qualified. 147 Congress should
make it clear that employees bear the burden of informing em-
ployers of their disabilities 148 to prevent confusion on the part of
142. Id. § 12101(b)(4). For example, the ADA waives a state's Eleventh
Amendment immunity so claims may be brought against state governments who
discriminate in their role as employers of individuals with disabilities. See supra
note 27.
143. 42 U.S.C. § 12114(a) (1994). The language "currently using illegal drugs
.. does not require the employer to prove the individual illegally used drugs at
the time of the action. The act is intended to deny protection to an individual
whose illegal use of drugs has 'occurred recently enough to justify a reasonable
belief' that the person's drug use is current." Murphy, supra note 63, at 22.
(emphasis added).
144. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). See statutory text supra note 20.
145. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(C)(v) (1994).
146. Kass, supra note 22, at 2 n.2.




the disabled employee trying to maximize his protection. Clearer
articulation of what constitutes a reasonable accommodation 149 or
a direct threat would also help employers protect themselves from
liability and help employees protect their rights from the outset. 150
Conclusion
Addiction must be recognized for what it is: a disabling
physical and psychological disease. 51 In addition to the disabling
effects of addiction, its often private nature makes it an inappro-
priate subject for employers when effects of the disease are not
manifested in the employment setting. The courts and legislature
need to recognize that activities outside of the employment setting
should not be subject to the intrusion of employers without a mani-
festation of the disability that affects the workplace. Drug and al-
cohol addiction should also not be a factor in employment decisions
when the employee is "otherwise qualified." The Rehabilitation
Act forbids discrimination by employers "solely on the basis of' an
employee's disability in such cases.' 52
Courts need to focus on medical realities rather than social
prejudices, and protect addicts in the workplace as any other per-
son with a disability is protected by the ADA and the Rehabilita-
tion Act. When a lung cancer patient, who acquires her disease
from smoking, experiences a period of remission after a successful
round of treatments, we do not stigmatize her habit or tell her that
it was "about time" she kicked her "filthy smoking problem." We
realize this is not the time to point fingers of blame. It is time to
focus on accommodation and healing. Accordingly, the courts in-
terpreting employment discrimination laws must not banish and
shun drug and alcohol addicts who start the rehabilitation process.
Addicts need help before, during and after treatment just as much
as the cancer patient. A frigid, intolerant and discriminatory leg-
islative and judicial system offers little security and encourage-
149. Id.
150. For example, the Rehabilitation Act currently prohibits the use of alcohol
that creates a direct threat to the property or safety of others. 29 U.S.C.
§ 706(8)(C)(v). A doctor with an alcohol problem who drinks before work and then
performs surgery is clearly a direct threat to "others" (i.e. patients). Although a
secretary who drinks before work and then answers phones and greets people
seems to be much less a threat, the current definition leaves these discretionary
factual decisions to the courts. The legislature should act to protect disabled indi-
viduals specifically, rather than wait for the courts to do so.
151. For a discussion of addiction as a disabling disease, see supra note 48.
152. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
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ment to the diseased and disabled addicts whom we are legally
and morally bound to protect from discrimination.
The trend toward intolerance must be rejected in favor of a
course toward compassion. Judicial interpretations of statutes
protecting addicts against discrimination in the workplace as a re-
sult of their disability must remember the stated purpose of the
legislation: "to provide a clear and comprehensive national man-
date for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities."153
153. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).
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